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ABSTRACT 
Darwin himself suggested the idea of generalizing the core Darwinian principles to cover the 
evolution of social entities. Also in the nineteenth century, influential social scientists 
proposed their extension to political society and economic institutions. Nevertheless, 
misunderstanding and misrepresentation have hindered the realization of the powerful 
potential in this longstanding idea. Some critics confuse generalization with analogy. Others 
mistakenly presume that generalizing Darwinism necessarily involves biological 
reductionism. This essay outlines the types of phenomena to which a generalized Darwinism 
applies, and upholds that there is no reason to exclude social or economic entities. 
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In Defence of Generalized Darwinism 
Howard E. Aldrich, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, David L. Hull, Thorbjørn Knudsen, Joel Mokyr 
and Viktor J. Vanberg 
1. Introduction 
Both biology and the social sciences address diverse systems of enormous complexity.1 
Historical and other empirical details will always remain of immense importance and thus we 
cannot expect to obtain a single explanatory theory of everything. However, as the triumph of 
Darwinism in biology demonstrates, it is possible to derive a powerful over-arching 
theoretical framework in which theorists can develop auxiliary, domain-specific explanations. 
This is the promise of a generalized Darwinism. Although biologists and social scientists have 
pointed to other important mechanisms, such as self-organization and path dependence, none 
of these offers a general over-arching explanatory framework for beginning to understand the 
evolution of all these systems.2 
Darwin himself recognized the potential broader significance of his core ideas, proposing 
that natural selection operates upon the elements of language and that natural selection 
favoured tribal groups with moral and other propensities that served the common good 
(Darwin, 1859, pp. 422-3; 1871, vol. 1, pp. 59-61, 106, 166). Following this lead, other 
writers such as Walter Bagehot (1872), David Ritchie (1896), Thorstein Veblen (1899) and 
Albert Keller (1915) argued that the principle of selection could help explain the survival not 
only of individuals, but also of groups, customs, nations, business firms and other social 
institutions. The idea of generalizing Darwinism was later revived by V. Gordon Childe 
(1951), Donald T. Campbell (1965), Richard Dawkins (1976, 1983), Friedrich Hayek (1988), 
Daniel Dennett (1995) and others.3 
Although the idea of generalizing core Darwinian principles in the social sciences has a 
long history, it has not proved popular. Resistance to abstract Darwinian ideas probably 
results from a general wariness by social scientists to the importation of concepts from 
biology (Degler, 1991), rather than from any adequately detailed critique of the proposal for a 
                                                 
1 The November 2006 issue of the Journal of Evolutionary Economics was a „Special issue on universal 
Darwinism‟. However, while containing critiques such as Cordes (2006), it contained no overall defence of the 
idea of generalizing Darwinian principles to the social or economic domain. This essay attempts to fill this gap. 
The authors are very grateful to Pavel Pelikan, Sidney Winter and anonymous referees for comments. 
2 Leading proponents of self-organization themselves recognize this. See Kauffman (1993, p. 644) and Camazine 
et al. (2001, p. 89). 
3 Dawkins‟s (1983) term „universal Darwinism‟ may misleadingly suggest that Darwinism covers everything or 
has „universal validity‟ (Dawkins, 1976, p. 205). As explained below, Darwinian principles apply to complex 
population systems only, notwithstanding that this covers a highly capacious set of phenomena. 
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generalized Darwinism. Dismissals of the idea have typically been brief. We explain why 
such critiques are off target below. 
Other critics mistakenly conflate „universal Darwinism‟ with „genetic reductionism‟ or 
„ultra-Darwinism‟.4 Although Dawkins is responsible for the term „universal Darwinism‟ and 
is also associated with a gene-centred view of biological evolution, the idea of generalizing 
Darwinism is logically independent of whether or not a gene-centred view is appropriate in 
biology. Furthermore, generalized Darwinism does not claim that social or economic 
phenomena can be explained in biological terms. It is not a version of biological reductionism 
and logically it does not apply principally or exclusively to biology. As J. Stanley Metcalfe 
(1998, pp. 21-2) puts it: 
That evolution is a core concept in biology does not mean that it is an inherently 
biological concept. Evolution can happen in other domains providing that conditions for 
an evolutionary process are in place. Thus, as economists applying evolutionary ideas to 
economic phenomena, we can learn from the debates on evolutionary biology in order to 
understand better the logical status of concepts such as fitness, adaptation and unit of 
selection without in any sense needing to absorb the associated biological context. 
Contrary to the misconceptions of some its critics, the idea of generalizing Darwinism has 
little to do with biological metaphors or analogies. Instead of drawing analogies, which are 
often inexact and sometimes treacherous, generalized Darwinism relies on the claim of 
common abstract features in both the social and the biological world; it is essentially a 
contention of a degree of ontological communality, at a high level of abstraction and not at the 
level of detail. This communality is captured by concepts such as replication and selection, 
which are defined as precisely and meaningfully as possible but in a highly general and 
abstract sense. 
What is the difference between analogy and generalization? With an analogy, phenomena 
and processes in one domain are taken as the reference point for the study of similar 
phenomena or processes in another domain. Differences are regarded as dis-analogies. On this 
basis, for example, social evolution is clearly dis-analogous to genetic evolution, because of 
the very different entities and mechanisms of replication. By contrast, for example, the 
Keynesian „circular flow of income‟ may have some analogous features with hydraulic 
mechanisms, as illustrated by the famous Phillips Machine that simulates money flows 
through water in transparent tubes. Some theories of the business cycle use the analogy of a 
pendulum and thereby deploy similar differential equations. These analogical claims are 
different from generalizations. 
Generalization in science starts from a deliberately copious array of different phenomena 
and processes, without giving analytical priority to any of them over others. Where possible, 
scientists adduce shared principles. Given that the entities and processes involved are very 
different, these common principles will be highly abstract and will not reflect detailed 
mechanisms unique to any particular domain. 
For example, the laws of motion in physics apply equally to planets, rockets and billiard 
balls, despite huge differences of size, composition and shape. We can generalize across these 
                                                 
4 Rose (1997) has a long chapter entitled „Universal Darwinism?‟ which very briefly (pp. 175-6) mentions 
memes and „neural Darwinism‟ (Edelman, 1987), dismisses them without detailed criticism, and then devotes its 
remaining 20 pages to biological issues that have no relevance to the claim that core Darwinian principles can be 
applied to social entities and social evolution. 
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domains because, at an abstract level, the same principles apply to all the phenomena, despite 
major differences in their features. In biology and in the social sciences, the phenomena are so 
complex that scientists supplement general principles by many more auxiliary and 
particularistic explanations, thus differentiating these sciences from physics (Mayr, 1985). 
Critics of generalized Darwinism have often failed to distinguish between analogy and 
generalization, different levels of abstraction, and different domains of similarity or 
dissimilarity. Some critics have emphasized the dissimilarity between the social and 
biological domain (Buenstorf 2006; Cordes 2006; Nelson, 2007; Witt 2003, 2004, 2006). The 
claim that social and biological evolution are different at the level of detail is important and 
true, but ultimately irrelevant to the project of generalizing Darwinism. 
Generalizing Darwinism does not rely on the mistaken idea that the mechanisms of 
evolution in the social and the biological world are similar in a substantive sense. Not only do 
natural and social evolution differ greatly in their details, but also detailed mechanisms differ 
greatly within the biological world. Biological organisms differ enormously in size, lifespan 
and reproductive fertility. Some biological species are sexually differentiated, others not. 
Some biological species are social, others not. Replication among invertebrates is different 
from that among vertebrates. To say that two sets of phenomena are similar in highly general 
terms does not imply that they are similar in detailed respects. 
Even for biological phenomena the high degree of generality required to accommodate the 
full range of diversity turns out to be extensive enough to include the processes of social and 
cultural evolution as well (Hull, 1988, p. 403). Because the processes of selection and 
replication vary greatly in the biological domain, the general principles adduced from 
biological evolution turn out to apply to other complex phenomena as well.  
The differences between the biological and the cultural domains are real and important. 
Cultural selection processes are different from biological selection processes.  The expression 
of the underlying core Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and selection differ in 
important ways, yet the over-arching general principles remain.     
For example, Ulrich Witt (2003, 2004) claims that the core Darwinian principles are 
inappropriate for the cultural domain because of many important differences to biological 
reality.5 Ironically, this has led Witt to formulate a „continuity hypothesis‟, according to 
which cultural evolution continues beyond that point within the freedom left by the 
constraints of Darwinian theory.  As Witt (2004, pp. 131-2) writes, biological evolution has 
„shaped the ground, and still defines the constraints, for … cultural, evolution … The 
historical process of economic evolution can be conceived as emerging from, and being 
embedded in, the constraints shaped by evolution in nature.‟ As far as we are aware, all 
proponents of generalized Darwinism would concur.6 The irony is that Witt also emphasizes a 
                                                 
5 For a discussion of Witt‟s argument see Vanberg (2006). 
6 Witt (2003, 2004) makes the point that diffusion of novelty rather than selection forces drive cultural evolution.  
While this point appears controversial to Witt (2003, 2004), Cordes (2006) and others, it is does not contradict 
general Darwinian principles.  It is merely the (feasible) empirical claim that the second term of the Price 
equation is more important than its first term. The Price (1970, 1995) equation addresses changes of average 
fitness due to selection for a population property related to the characteristics of individual members. It shows 
that this population level outcome can be regarded as the sum of two distinct effects. The first term in the 
equation is the covariance of the individual properties and their individual fitness values, showing the extent to 
which possession of the property bestows fitness on individuals. The second term is a transmission effect, 
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radical discontinuity between biological and social evolution, where generalized Darwinian 
principles apply to one but not to the other. On this point we disagree. 
Admittedly, proponents of generalized Darwinism still disagree over many subsidiary 
points, including aspects of the precise definitions of replication and selection. It is an 
unfinished research project. Our essay represents a catholic view, drawing on several authors 
with some differences of opinion on finer points, but all upholding the possibility and 
importance of a generalized Darwinism. We also concur with Metcalfe (1998, p. 36) when he 
writes: 
Nothing I have said is intrinsically a matter of biological analogy, it is a matter of 
evolutionary logic. Evolutionary theory is a manner of reasoning in its own right quite 
independently of the use made of it by biologists. 
The following section addresses the types of evolving phenomena to which Darwinian 
principles apply. Section 3 outlines these general principles. Section 4 discusses the 
significance of the modern Darwinian concepts of replicator and interactor. Section 5 
considers the relevance and value of a generalized Darwinism in the social sciences. The final 
section summarizes and concludes the argument. 
2. The ontological domain of a generalized Darwinism 
We could develop our argument in one of two ways from this point. One would be to examine 
inductively a number of evolutionary processes in nature and society and determine what 
common principles apply to them, whereas the other would be to identify some general 
ontological characteristics that must apply to all evolving systems. With regard to the first 
approach, for example, Hull et al. (2001) compare processes of evolutionary selection 
regarding genes, the reaction of the immune system to antigens, and operant learning. They 
show that deriving a general definition of selection that applies to all these processes without 
becoming vacuous is far from easy. Ultimately, the project to generalize Darwinism must roll 
up its sleeves and delve into such empirical issues. 
Unfortunately, the application of Darwinian principles to social or economic evolution has 
been impaired by a lack of consensus concerning what is actually selected or replicated. 
Richard Dawkins (1976) famously dubbed the unit of cultural evolution as a „meme‟. 
However, disputes have raged concerning the nature of a meme and no consensus has 
emerged. 
One legitimate reaction to this impasse would be to adopt the strategy described above and 
empirically compare many processes of social selection and replication, in an attempt to 
induce common general principles. However, a lack of consensus among evolutionary social 
scientists means that few commonly accepted domains and entities have been identified as a 
basis for comparison. 
With regard to the second approach, we can accept that at some later stage, detailed 
comparisons will be essential, but in the interim we can make progress by approaching the 
                                                                                                                                                        
whereby changing properties of existing individuals lead to modifications of their individual fitnesses, such as 
through innovation or learning. With the first effect the population changes through selection; with the second 
effect the change comes through the transformations of individuals or entities. Witt and Cordes suggest that the 
second effect is more important. This is a matter of empirical enquiry and not a test of the principles of 
generalized Darwinism. Indeed, without Darwinian selection there would be no way of removing useless 
novelties (Pavel Pelikan, private correspondence). 
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problem from the other end. Instead of working upwards from detail to generality, it is 
possible to consider some general ontological characteristics that must apply to the relevant 
systems and populations under consideration. We describe the relevant phenomena as 
„complex population systems‟.7 
The term refers to both biological and social phenomena. By outlining the general, shared 
features of complex population systems we identify the ontological communality to which we 
referred above. We posit that all complex population systems can be analysed in terms of 
general Darwinian principles. The systems considered here involve populations of entities. 
Populations are defined by members of a type that are similar in key respects, but within each 
type there is some degree of variation, due to genesis or circumstances.8 
We assume that entities within these populations have limited capacities to consume some 
materials and energy from their environment and they have gained the use of mechanisms 
with which to process some information useful for survival. These entities may or may not 
have a developed brain or memory. They may or may not be capable of reflecting on their 
circumstances and remembering past or imagining future behaviours. 
All these entities are mortal and degradable, and they need to consume materials and energy 
in order to survive or minimize degradation. However, because they do not have access to all 
environmental resources at once, these entities face an omnipresent problem of local and 
immediate scarcity, as well as the possibility of binding resource constraints.9 These 
circumstances present specific problems that the entities must solve to minimize degradation 
and raise their chances of survival. In short, these entities are engaged in a struggle for 
existence, to use the term adopted by Darwin (1859, pp. 62-63). 
Finally, we assume some capacity to retain and pass on to others workable solutions to 
problems they have faced. The advantages of retaining such problem solutions or adaptations 
are obvious in avoiding the risks and costs of learning them anew. We assume that the entities 
possess some capacity to pass on to others information about such workable solutions, 
providing the foundation for a trans-generational cumulative growth of problem-solving 
„knowledge.‟ 
This is the basis of the Darwinian principle of inheritance, which refers to a broad class of 
mechanisms, including those of „replication‟ and „descent‟ (Mayr 1991), by which 
information concerning adaptations is retained, preserved, passed on or copied through time. 
In sum, a complex population system involves populations of non-identical (intentional or 
non-intentional) entities that face locally scarce resources and problems of survival. The 
entities retain some adaptive solutions to such problems and may pass them on to other 
entities. Examples of populations in such systems are plentiful both in nature and in human 
society. They include every biological species, from amoeba to humans. They would include 
self-replicating automata, of the type discussed by John von Neumann (1966). In addition, 
                                                 
7 This account of complex population systems makes use of material from Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a), where 
some further details of the argument appear. 
8 See Mayr (1976, p. 28; 1982, pp. 46f.) for a discussion of the contrast between „population thinking‟ and the 
outlook of the „typologist.‟ 
9 See Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a, p. 4) for a discussion of this specific concept of scarcity. 
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and importantly for the social scientist, they include human institutions, as long as we regard 
institutions as cohesive entities having some capacity for the retention and replication of 
problem solutions. 
In this manner, the common ontological features of all complex population systems, 
including in nature and human society, are established, without ignoring the huge differences 
of detail between them. 
3. The core Darwinian principles 
Having sketched in broad terms the type of evolutionary system we are considering, it 
becomes evident that the evolution of such a system must involve the three Darwinian 
principles of variation, selection and retention (Campbell, 1965). These abstract principles do 
not themselves provide all the necessary details, but nevertheless they must be honoured, for 
otherwise the explanation of evolution will be inadequate. 
Consider the three Darwinian principles in turn. First, there must be some explanation of 
how variety is generated and replenished in a population. In biological systems the answers – 
established since Darwin‟s death – involve genetic recombination and mutations. By contrast, 
the evolution of social institutions involves imitation, planning and other mechanisms very 
different from the detailed processes found in biology (Aldrich and Ruef 2006). The general 
problem of the existence and replenishment of variety remains a vital question of evolutionary 
research in the social and technological domain (Metcalfe 1998, Nelson 1991, Saviotti 1996). 
Second, there must be an explanation for how useful information concerning solutions to 
particular adaptive problems is retained and passed on. This requirement follows directly from 
our assumptions concerning the broad nature of complex population systems, wherein there 
must be some mechanism by which adaptive solutions are copied and passed on. In biology, 
these mechanisms often involve genes and DNA. In social evolution, we may include the 
replication of habits, customs, rules and routines, all of which may carry solutions to adaptive 
problems. Some mechanism must exist that ensures that some such solutions endure and 
replicate; otherwise the continuing retention of useful knowledge would not be possible 
(Vanberg 1994). 
Third, and not least, there must be an explanation of the fact that entities differ in their 
longevity and fecundity. In given contexts, some entities are more adapted than others, some 
survive longer than others, and some are more successful in producing offspring or copies of 
themselves. Here we invoke the principle of selection. Briefly, selection involves an anterior 
set of entities, each interacting with its environment and somehow being transformed into a 
posterior set where all members of the posterior set are sufficiently similar to some members 
of the anterior set, and where the resulting frequencies of posterior entities depend upon their 
properties in the environmental context (Price, 1970, 1995). Through selection, a set of 
entities, a population, will gradually adapt in response to the criteria defined by an 
environmental factor.  
Although this is a broad definition of selection, it is nevertheless sharp enough to 
distinguish itself from the principle of variation. The latter requires some explanation of the 
sources and replenishments of variety. Selection refers to the mechanisms that bring about the 
survival of some variations rather than others, often reducing variety. Even when both variety-
creation and selection involve human agency, as often is the case in the human domain, the 
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two processes are quite distinct. Innovation is about the creation of new variations, whereas 
selection is about how they are tested in the real world.  
Note that the outcomes of a selection process are necessarily neither moral nor just, even 
though as politically organized communities, humans may impose moral constraints on social 
processes by adopting „rules of the game‟ or institutional provisions that replace „natural 
selection‟ by „artificial‟ or „purposeful‟ selection (Commons 1934; Vanberg 1997; Hodgson 
2004a). Furthermore, there is no requirement that the outcomes of a selection process be 
necessarily optimal or an improvement on their precursors. Insofar as these outcomes carry 
connotations of refinement or efficiency, it is efficiency relative to the given environment, and 
efficiency that is tolerable rather than optimal. Darwinism does not assume that selection 
brings about globally efficient or (near) optimal outcomes, and in certain instances, selection 
can even lead to systematic errors or maladaptions (Hodgson 1993; Hull 2001). 
Without the principle of selection, we have no way of explaining how some entities or their 
offspring prevail over others. The principle is widely held to apply in the natural world; some 
members of a species often have greater chances of survival and procreation. This helps to 
explain how species, over the long term, become adapted to their environment. Note that the 
move from the natural to the social world does not undermine the principle of selection. Even 
if there is not a fierce life-and-death struggle between rival customs or institutions, some 
explanation is required of why some enjoy greater longevity than others, why some are 
imitated more than others, and why some diminish and decline. Any such explanation must 
come under the general rubric of selection, as defined above.  
Overall, as long as there is a population within which entities display variation in the 
acquisition of characteristics vital to survival, then Darwinian evolution will occur. However, 
Darwin‟s principles of evolution do not themselves provide a complete explanation. 
Darwinism does not provide a complete theory of everything, from cells to human society. 
Instead, these principles are a kind of „meta-theory‟, or an over-arching theoretical framework 
wherein theorists place particular explanations. Crucially, explanations additional to natural 
selection are always required to explain any evolved phenomenon. For example, natural 
selection alone cannot explain why some birds have dull and others colourful plumage. 
Different auxiliary explanations are required, such as camouflage against predators in some 
cases, or competition for mates and sexual selection in others. Selection is a general principle, 
but it operates in different ways in different contexts. Likewise, the general Darwinian 
principle of variation applies, but it does not itself explain how variation occurs. 
To repeat: acknowledging the role of Darwinian principles in social evolution does not 
imply that the detailed mechanisms of selection, variation and inheritance are analogous or 
similar. Consequently, the application of general Darwinian principles cannot do all the 
explanatory work for the social scientist. Darwinism alone is not enough. 
Accordingly, the use of these general Darwinian principles does not mean any neglect of 
other features or mechanisms at the level of detail. The use of these principles does not 
amount to the kind of generalization where specific important features or additional processes 
are neglected. On the contrary they remain vital for the explanation. 
4. Replicators and interactors 
Modern Darwinian theory makes a distinction between „replicators‟ and „interactors‟ (Hull, 
1988). A number of authors have developed and refined the definition of a replicator. An 
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emerging consensus argues that replication involves a causal relationship between two or 
more entities, where there is substantial similarity between the original and replicated entities, 
and where information concerning adaptive solutions to survival problems is passed from one 
set of entities to another (Sterelny et al. 1996; Godfrey-Smith 2000; Sperber 2000). The 
definitional characteristics of causality, similarity and information transfer are common to 
these accounts. 
However, the consensus definition requires further refinement. Furthermore, there are very 
different types of replicators, even in the biological domain. For example, prions are widely 
regarded as replicators. Prions involve the accumulation of an abnormally folded variant of 
the normal prion protein, which spreads by direct contact through which the normal form also 
becomes misfolded and thus converted to an abnormal and equally infectious form (Prusiner, 
1998). By contrast, DNA contains information in its molecular structure that conditions the 
growth and behaviour of organisms. Unlike the prion, DNA involves context-responsive 
construction mechanisms that hold adaptive information attuned to past environments. 
Consequently, there may be different types of biological replicators, where DNA is a more 
sophisticated variant permitting the transfer of richer and more complex information 
(Szathmáry 2000; Hodgson and Knudsen 2008).10 
A consequence of this observation regarding diversity among replicators is that when we 
consider the social world, the possibility of different types of replicators emerges. None will 
be similar in detail or mechanism to DNA. If they exist, those social replicators that involve 
context-responsive construction mechanisms holding adaptive information will constitute a 
rather special and important case. The existence of social replicators cannot be denied simply 
because DNA-like mechanisms are absent. 
Turning to the interactor, this has been defined as „an entity that directly interacts as a 
cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to 
be differential‟ (Hull 1988, p. 408). Some theorists have suggested enhancements of this 
definition (Hodgson and Knudsen 2004b). Furthermore, more work is necessary to show how 
the interactor relates to the replicator, especially if multiple levels of replication or interaction 
occur. 
Clearly, there are cohesive evolving entities, in both the biological and social domains, such 
as organisms and organizations. The question arises as to whether such entities in the social 
world interact with their environments in ways that cause the differential replication of 
relevant stored information. If we consider economic competition between firms, then the 
elimination of some and the prosperity of others leads to the differential copying (by 
collaboration or imitation) of routines, techniques, management procedures, and so on 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Aldrich and Ruef 2006). If any of these elements qualify as social 
replicators, then clearly they are very different from biological replicators such as genes. 
There are crucial differences concerning how the information is stored, how it is replicated, 
and how faithful is the replication. The general definition of a replicator has to be deployed 
with care. Nevertheless, there is at least a prime facie case for identifying interactors and 
replicators in the social domain. 
Although so far there is no consensus on what social replicators or interactors are, three of 
us have argued that business firms are examples of social interactors, and individual habits 
                                                 
10 The general concept of information itself requires clarification in this context and has been subject to some 
debate. See for example Maynard Smith (2000a, 2002b), Griffiths (2001) and Godfrey-Smith (forthcoming). 
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and organizational routines qualify as replicators (Aldrich and Ruef 2006; Hodgson and 
Knudsen 2004b, 2006b, 2008). Other Darwinian theorists consider individuals or groups as 
interactors, and ideas as social or cultural replicators (Hull 1988; Mokyr 2006). These debates 
remain important among proponents of a generalized Darwinism. 
Some critics claim that a sharp replicator-interactor distinction is unviable or inappropriate 
in social evolution. It is interesting that they share this stance with other, quite different, 
theorists. The subset of evolutionary economists who resist a generalized Darwinism, 
exclusively gene-centred theorists, and biological reductionists, all deny the existence of 
social replicators (i.e. social entities that are copied in some way and conform to the general 
definition of a replicator). 
The distinction between replicators and interactors, their clear definition, and the discussion 
of different types of each, are important for further reasons. They are vital to distinguish 
between more superficial cases of contagion or diffusion, on the one hand, and more 
meaningful replication or inheritance on the other. For example, the spread of laughter or 
some fashions, are examples of diffusion that often do not necessarily involve inheritance. 
Diffusion may mean little more than the reception of a signal that triggers behaviour 
according to existing dispositions. For replication to occur, significant developmental 
dispositions and capacities must be copied that are new to the recipient, and these new 
capacities must themselves be capable of replication. An important feature of some replicators 
is that by the copying of such capacities they have the potential to increase the level of 
complexity in the system as a whole (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2008).11 
If there were no social replicators, then the principles of generalized Darwinism suggest 
that there is no mechanism in social evolution by which information concerning adaptations to 
the environment can be copied with some degree of fidelity through time. This would further 
imply that social evolution is less sophisticated than biological evolution, and has a more 
limited potential for the evolution of more complex phenomena. We see no reason at this 
stage to accept the premise of this argument. We assert that there is at least a prima facie case 
for identifying interactors and replicators in the social domain.  
Some critics fall prey to the unfounded assumption that unitary persistence, associated with 
high fidelity replication, is a necessary condition for selection to work. We do not have to 
establish that social replicators copy their information as reliably as genes (they certainly do 
not) in order to identify social replicators. As Stephen Jay Gould (2002) argued, it is 
plurifaction that matters, i.e. the increase in relative representation of a bundle of heritable 
attributes. Whether or not plurifaction happens by hi-fidelity replication is besides the point.  
While the replication of behaviour seems uncontroversial, it has recently been argued that 
the notions of replication and replicators are inappropriate for studying the spread of cognitive 
frames and representations (Atran, 2001, 2002; Boyer, 1994, 1999; Sperber, 1996). According 
to these critics, cognitive representations are non-discrete, cultural transmission is very 
inaccurate and therefore favours diversity over convergence, and strong cognitive attractors in 
                                                 
11 The replicator-interactor distinction also relates to the question of Lamarckism, which typically is taken to 
mean the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The replicator-interactor distinction is necessary to establish 
adequately the concept of inheritance in this context (Hull, 1982; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006b). Consequently, 
whether true or not, claims that social evolution is Lamarckian depend on a replicator-interactor distinction. 
Notably, Darwinism and Lamarckism are not mutually exclusive: Darwin (1859) himself believed in Lamarckian 
inheritance. However, Lamarckism alone is inadequate because it cannot explain why dysfunctional acquired 
characteristics are inherited without the invocation of a selection mechanism (Dawkins, 1983). 
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any case swamp the influence from selection forces. Even though cultural evolution is 
commonly non-discrete, low fidelity and strongly affected by cognitive processes, these 
observations are entirely an empirical matter. Joseph Henrich and Robert Boyd (2002) 
convincingly demonstrate that continuous attractors often reduce to the standard discrete 
replicator model and low fidelity replication does not preclude adaptation or accumulation at 
the cultural level.  
Our discussion in this section shows how the idea of a generalized Darwinism can be 
extended to help obtain important propositions concerning the general nature of evolution in 
complex population systems and how they apply in particular to evolution in human society. 
We have also highlighted recent work that demonstrates the usefulness of the Darwinian 
principles under conditions that are commonly ascribed to the social domain, i.e. noisy 
replication and possibly continuous traits. The following section explores further implications 
for our understanding of social evolution. 
5. Generalized Darwinism – its relevance and importance 
Appropriate generalization is at the core of all scientific endeavours. However, generalization 
should not go so far as to become vacuous. We believe that a generalized Darwinism sustains 
important substantial propositions that have application and relevance to evolution in human 
societies. We have already given some reasons for this claim. We add further supporting 
arguments below. 
There are a number of advantages of a general analysis of selection processes that builds on 
core Darwinian principles. It provides a focus for inquiry and enables a more systematic 
accumulation and organization of knowledge pertaining to a wider array of selection 
processes. A generalized Darwinism offers a broad definition of selection within which we 
can classify and compare different types of selection process. Even at an abstract level, two 
basic types of selection can be distinguished, namely subset and generative selection 
(Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006c). Further subdivisions and classifications are clearly possible, 
according to both mechanisms and outcomes. For instance, the George Price (1970, 1975) 
general definition of selection allows the diffusion of information or other features as a 
special case, but excludes random outcomes such as drift. 
Furthermore, as Hull et al. (2001) demonstrate, a generalized Darwinism can lead to 
comparative analyses of selection processes across empirical domains. We see a strong 
possibility that such empirical comparisons will lead to further revisions and refinements of 
our understanding of general selection principles. This is an important agenda for future 
research. 
For social scientists, the application of Darwinian ideas to social phenomena has important 
implications concerning the rationality and psyche of human agents. Assumptions concerning 
human agents must be susceptible to causal explanation, and be consistent with general 
Darwinian principles and our understanding of human evolution. These implications have 
been long acknowledged by a number of philosophers, psychologists and social scientists 
(James, 1890; Dewey, 1910; Veblen, 1914; Richards, 1987). 
One of these arguments concerns the concept of rationality. Darwin (1974, pp. 84, 115) 
himself wrote in 1856: „Men are called “creatures of reason,” more appropriately they would 
be “creatures of habit.”‟ Although Darwin did not elaborate further, we can draw out some of 
the implications from a generalized Darwinism. 
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The principles of generalized Darwinism focus on the development, retention and selection 
of information concerning adaptive solutions to survival problems faced by organisms or 
other relevant entities in their environment. The storage and replication of such information is 
a general feature of complex population systems. When we apply this framework to particular 
cases, questions naturally arise concerning the nature, mechanisms and material substrate of 
these adaptive solutions. Relevantly, the biologist and philosopher Ernst Mayr (1988) 
developed the concept of „program-based behaviour‟ involving sets of conditional, rule-like 
dispositions, linked together into what he termed “programs.”12 Instincts and biological 
genotypes involve programs. Human ideas, habits and customs can also have program-like 
qualities. Sophisticated replicators carry such behavioural programs. Generalized Darwinisn 
highlights their importance in evolutionary processes. 
Darwinism is successful because it supplies a framework for causal explanation of the 
evolution of complex, undesigned outcomes. Accordingly, Darwinism constantly raises 
questions of causality and requires explanations of origin. This applies in particular to the 
dispositional programs behind human behaviour. The consequences for the social sciences are 
important. Instead of simply assuming that agents hold beliefs and preferences, the paradigm 
of program-based behaviour requires an explanation of their evolutionary emergence, through 
both natural selection and individual development. Evolution involves both the adaptation of 
programs to changing circumstances and the elimination of other programs through selection. 
The conventional rational actor model in the social sciences simply sets out assumptions 
that are consistent with a set of behaviours. By contrast, the paradigm of program-based 
behaviour focuses on the explanation of the dispositions behind any act. The concept of the 
program may be subdivided between programs that do and do not involve deliberation or 
conscious prefiguration. The paradigm of program-based behaviour has been applied to 
economics by Vanberg (2002, 2004) and has strong similarities with John Holland‟s (1995) 
theory of adaptive agents. This paradigm is more adequate than the primary focus on 
rationality and beliefs. The related concept of habit – as a particular form of a program – has 
also been revisited and refined in this evolutionary context (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004a). 
A generalized Darwinism provides a framework in which particular (non-universal) 
evolutionary patterns and mechanisms can readily be considered. One example of this is the 
wider use of Niles Eldredge‟s and Stephen Jay Gould‟s (1977) concept of „punctuated 
equilibria‟. Within biology, this concept has attracted some criticism and debate (Somit and 
Peterson, 1992). Some scholars have misinterpreted it as a challenge to core Darwinian 
principles. It is not. Instead, a viable concept of punctuated equilibria posits that under 
specific conditions, Darwinian evolutionary processes can sometimes dramatically accelerate, 
and the whole system can shift relatively rapidly from one chaotic attractor to another. A 
number of authors have applied the concept of punctuated equilibria to social, organizational, 
institutional, political, cultural, economic and technological evolution.13 The viability of this 
concept in specific circumstances depends on not only a reconciliation with the framework of 
generalized Darwinism but also an examination of the specific mechanisms of replication and 
selection that have the potential to generate such dramatic shifts in the pattern of evolution. 
                                                 
12 In important respects the idea of „program-based behavior‟ was foreshadowed by Simon (1957) in his famous 
work on bounded rationality (March and Simon, 1958; Vanberg, 2002, pp. 24 ff.). 
13 See Miller and Friesen (1980), Tushman and Romanelli (1985), Collins (1988), Krasner (1988), Hannan and 
Freeman (1989), Mokyr (1990), Gersick (1991), Gowdy (1993), Aoki (2001) and others. 
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Crucially, Darwinism focuses our attention on the possible mechanisms through which 
variety is preserved and created. It is remarkable that two of the most important mechanisms 
identified by Darwin (1859) and retained in modern biology depend on locational 
considerations. First, the migration of a group to another area with a different physical 
environment, and second the use or creation of different niches, remain two of the most 
important mechanisms to explain speciation. Related ideas would seem to transfer directly to 
the social or economic domain, for example with the creation of new products or industries in 
different geographical and institutional contexts. In these cases the new environment, and the 
(relative) isolation of a group from the majority, create new opportunities for variation. 
As the population becomes subdivided into (relatively) isolated subsets, small mutations 
can have bigger overall effects for the population as a whole. Furthermore, the different 
environments require different fitness characteristics for survival. New species may emerge as 
a result of physical separation or the demands of different environments. 
Crucially, similar arguments apply to human institutions as well as biological organisms, 
notwithstanding the fact that the nature and mechanisms of mutation and separation are very 
different. The general ideas of mutation and physical separation particularly apply to the 
evolution of languages and all sorts of customs. For example, relative isolation and language 
change leads to subdivision and often the creation of new languages. 
In addition, there is now a growing literature on how firms may perform differently in 
different contexts, such as under different regulatory regimes or among different types of 
financial institutions (Amable, 2000; Aoki, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Boyer, 2005; 
Kenworthy, 2006). 
The above examples show how the framework of a generalized Darwinism can be helpful 
in organizing and promoting specific research programmes in the social domain. A 
generalized Darwinism does not itself provide all the answers. For example, it neither 
specifies the detailed sources of variation nor explains individual innovations. Nevertheless, it 
identifies essential evolutionary mechanisms in a general form, particularly concerning 
replication, selection and the impact of variation. Applied rigorously, it forces authors to be 
specific and precise in defining units of analysis. It also forces analysts to be historical, 
because no matter what the exact set-up or units of analyses are, such an evolutionary analysis 
forces attention on processes going back into the past, their built-in tendencies to persist 
(through „replication‟) and how the present is created as variations on the past. In that sense, 
all social scientists relying on this framework will be forced to take history into account 
(Mokyr, 1996). 
By itself, a generalized Darwinism is insufficient to provide a complete answer, but it 
provides a general framework in which additional and context specific explanations may be 
placed. Its further usefulness depends on additional and extensive work. Despite several 
earlier and partial starts, the research programme is still in its infancy. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
Evolutionary theory has for a century been viewed by many scholars to be highly useful to 
economics (Nelson, 1995; Metcalfe, 1998), but it has sometimes been resisted because of a 
confusion between a general theory of change and sometimes unsuccessful attempts to 
shoehorn concepts or analogies from biology into economics. As we have insisted above, the 
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idea of generalizing Darwinism is not about analogies and does not depend on the proposition 
that the detailed mechanisms of social and biological evolution are similar. They are certainly 
not. Furthermore, the mechanisms of selection and replication are very different between 
different entities within the biological domain. Consequently we should expect considerable 
evolutionary differences of entity and mechanism both (a) between nature and society and (b) 
within society itself. Instead of detailed similarity, the idea of generalizing Darwinism 
depends on a degree of ontological communality at a highly abstract level. This communality 
is captured by the broad idea of a complex population system and the formulation of highly 
general concepts of selection and replication. 
Proposals for a generalized Darwinism are also unaffected by the claim that Darwinism, or 
the principles of selection, inheritance and variation are inadequate to explain social 
evolution. They are definitely inadequate. They are also insufficient to explain detailed 
outcomes in the biological sphere. In neither domain are these core Darwinian principles 
sufficient. In both cases auxiliary principles are required. However, none of this undermines 
the validity of generalization at an abstract level. Insufficiency does not amount to invalidity. 
Furthermore, given the existence of complex population systems in both nature and society, a 
generalized Darwinism is the only over-arching framework we have for placing detailed 
specific mechanisms. 
Given these rebuttals, how could one criticize the idea of generalizing Darwinism? Critics 
could argue that the ontology of complex population systems does not apply to socio-
economic evolution. Alternatively, critics could attempt to show that explanations of complex 
population systems do not require the Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance or 
selection. Finally, the critics could apply the rigorous definitions of variation, inheritance and 
selection to socio-economic phenomena and show that the outcomes are not particularly 
meaningful or useful. The idea of generalizing Darwinism is not immune to criticism, but 
previous critiques have generally been misconceived or misplaced. 
We hypothesize that much of the resistance to the idea of generalizing Darwinism to 
include social evolution stems from an ingrained suspicion of social scientists to ideas from 
biology. Students in the social sciences are repeatedly warned against „social Darwinism‟ and 
any idea of explaining human behaviour in terms of genes. Not only are the issues more 
complex than the students are often told, but also the idea of generalizing Darwinism has 
nothing to do with standard (and often dubious) accounts by social scientists of „social 
Darwinism‟, „sociobiology‟ or „genetic reductionism‟.14 
We urge that the idea of generalizing Darwinism not be confused with „genetic 
reductionism‟ and other aforementioned ideas. On the contrary, many opponents of a 
generalized Darwinism have something in common with the reductionists they likewise 
eschew. Gene-centred theorists, biological reductionists, and those evolutionary economists 
who resist a generalized Darwinism all deny the existence of replicators at a social level. An 
adequately formulated generalized Darwinism sustains replication and selection on multiple 
levels and resists rather than endorses biological reductionism. 
On the other hand, the idea of generalizing Darwinism to socio-economic evolution 
challenges the longstanding idea among social scientists that social and biological phenomena 
should be completely partitioned, that social scientists have little to learn from biology, and 
                                                 
14 See Bannister (1979) and Hodgson (2004b) on social Darwinism, and Segerstråle (2000) on the reactions of 
social scientists to sociobiology. 
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vice versa. A generalized Darwinism is consistent with the idea that human society is 
embedded in the natural world and depends upon it for its survival. 
We have also argued here that a generalized Darwinism sustains important, non-vacuous 
propositions that are highly relevant to the evolution in human societies, while other auxiliary 
explanations are also required. A generalized Darwinism systematizes the process of 
empirical inquiry and organizes detailed knowledge pertaining to a wide variety of 
evolutionary processes. 
Furthermore, Darwinian ideas have important implications for social scientists concerning 
the rationality and psyche of human agents. Assumptions concerning human agents must be 
consistent with our understanding of human evolution. Darwinian evolution involves the 
development, retention and selection of information concerning adaptive solutions to survival 
problems faced by organisms in their environment. Darwinism constantly raises questions of 
causality and requires explanations of origin. This applies in particular to the dispositional 
programs behind human thought and behaviour. 
Overall, Darwinism by itself is insufficient to provide full and complete answers, but it 
provides a general framework in which additional and context specific explanations may be 
placed. Its further usefulness depends on additional and extensive work. Despite several 
earlier historical efforts, this research programme is still at the stage of elucidating the key 
concepts involved. We are also entering an exciting phase of detailed empirical application. 
We welcome others to join in these efforts. 
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